China and North Korea: The Leverage Dilemma - 2018 Study of Nuclear Weapons Buildup and History of Negotiations, Six-Party Talks and Multinational Efforts, Altering Behavior and Denuclearization

Nonfiction, History, Military, Nuclear Warfare, Asian, China

• Author: Progressive Management
• ISBN: 9780463025925
• Publisher: Progressive Management
• Publication: June 13, 2018
• Imprint: Smashwords Edition
• Language: English

This important 2018 report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction.

Various nations in the international domain speculate that China alone has enough leverage to compel North Korea into giving up its nuclear weapons. However, China claims that its influence over North Korea is limited. Although China remains North Korea's most important ally, their relationship often has been categorized as complex and ambiguous, as both countries are driven by a shared history of succumbing to foreign aggression. Some argue that historical events led the two countries to become estranged rather than to become strong allies. Conversely, others contend that the history between China and North Korea drives both countries to maintain an enduring alliance. Therefore, this study answers the question: Does China alone possess enough leverage to have major influence on North Korea's behavior? Through analysis of China and North Korea's alliance formation, the first and second nuclear crises, and the Six Party Talks, this study contends that China alone does not have enough leverage to alter North Korea's behavior because diplomatic ties are not as close as some may believe. Therefore, the international community should cooperate with China so that influence may be gained over North Korea's behavior.

I. INTRODUCTION * A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION * B. SIGNIFICANCE * C. LITERATURE REVIEW * 1. Why Alliances Form * 2. Great Power-Small Power Alliances * 3. China and North Korea's Alliance Behavior * D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES * 1. Hypothesis 1: Maintaining Stability and Limiting Outside Influence Matters More than Using Leverage * 2. Hypothesis 2: China Will Leverage If North Korea's Actions Cause Destabilization * 3. Hypothesis 3: North Korea Will Become More Defiant If China Allows Outside Threats to Disrupt their Alliance * E. RESEARCH DESIGN * F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE * II. BLOOD OR WATER? * A. INTRODUCTION * B. NORTH KOREA: UNITY UNDER ITS TERMS * C. CHINA: A WAR FAR FROM FORGOTTEN * D. CHINA AND NORTH KOREA: BREAKING AWAY FROM THE SOVIET'S STRONGHOLD * E. CONCLUSION: POWER BEFORE FRIENDSHIP * III. NUCLEAR PURSUIT AND NUCLEAR DEFIANCE * A. INTRODUCTION * B. THE NUCLEAR CHASE * C. THE NORTH'S EXPOSURE * D. CHINA AND THE FIRST NUCLEAR CRISIS * E. THE NORTH'S SECOND EXPOSURE * F. CHINA AND THE SECOND NUCLEAR CRISIS * G. CONCLUSION: CHINA'S POLITICAL LEVERAGE VERSUS NORTH KOREA'S DEFIANCE * IV. NUKES, NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE PRICE OF BARGAINING * A. INTRODUCTION * B. CHINA AND NORTH KOREA'S INTERESTS IN THE SIX PARTY TALKS * C. ROUND ONE: REFUSALS TO BUDGE * D. ROUND TWO: NORTH KOREA MAKES THE FIRST MOVE * E. ROUND THREE: GETTING NOWHERE FAST * F. CONTINUED CLASHES AND FAILED DIPLOMACY * G. CONCLUSION: THE PRICE OF BARGAINING IS REASSURANCE * V. UNDERSTANDING THE CHINA AND NORTH KOREA LEVERAGE DILEMMA * A. INTRODUCTION * 1. The China and North Korea Alliance Arises * 2. North Korea's Nuclear Achievement and China's Worst Fear * 3. Multinational Efforts and North Korea's Defiance * B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHINA AND NORTH KOREA LEVERAGE DILEMMA * C. CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CHINA AND NORTH KOREA LEVERAGE DILEMMA